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THE PROFESSIONALISM MOVEMENT: THE
PROBLEMS DEFINED
JACK L. SAMMONS*
Circularly defined, the "Professionalism Movement" is the
name given to a wide variety of activities of the American Bar
Association, various state bar associations, and courts to
improve the professionalism of American lawyers. There are
several candidates for the beginning of the Movement, but the
one most frequently recognized is the speech Justice Burger
gave in 1984 to the American Bar Association in Las Vegas.'
This speech, so the story goes, set off a sympathetic reaction
that eventually led to the ABA Commission on Professionalism
and its Stanley Report, ". . . In the Spirit of Public Service"- A
Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism;2 the ABA Spe-
cial Coordinating Committee on Professionalism; the ABA's
newsletter on professionalism, The Professional Lawyer; numer-
ous state bar commissions and committees on professional-
ism 3 ; state supreme court commissions and committees on
professionalism4 ; the adoption and promulgation of profes-
* Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer
University. Professor Sammons is the author of LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM
(1988).
My thanks to Ted Blumoff, Linda Edwards, Stanley Hauerwas, David
Oedel and Tom Shaffer for helpful comments. Thanks too to Pamela Boykin
for research assistance. And, as always, thanks to Tedham Porterhouse for
inspiration.
1. See Warren E. Burger, The State ofJustice, A.B.A.J., Apr. 1984, at 62.
2. A.B.A. COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, "... . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC
SERVICE": A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM
(1986). This work, I think, was seriously flawed in some of its
recommendations, but I am not attacking or defending its recommendations
here. For a critique of the "Blueprint," see Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyers and
Professionalism: A Commentary on the Report of the American Bar Association
Commission on Professionalism, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1149 (1987).
3. See, e.g., SPECIAL COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM, ILLINOIS ST. BAR
Ass'N, THE BAR, THE BENCH, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN ILLINOIS: PROUD
TRADITIONS, TOUGH NEW PROBLEMS, CURRENT CHOICES (1987). In bar
association terminology, a commission includes lay members while a
committee does not. Georgia has had a Committee on Professionalism with a
Sub-Committee on Professionalism in the Law Schools since 1985.
4. For example, the Georgia Chief Justice's Commission on
Professionalism, now under direction of Hvelett H. Askew and Sally
Lockwood.
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sionalism creeds, aspirational statements and codes of civility
by state bar associations, state and federal courts,5 and by the
ABA; 6 revised oaths; 7 studies of lawyer civility;8 continuing
5. The Georgia lawyer's creed is:
A Lawyer's Creed
To my clients, I offer faithfulness, competence, diligence and
goodjudgement. I will strive to represent you as I would want to be
represented and to be worthy of your trust.
To the opposing parties and their counsel, I offer fairness,
integrity, and civility. I will seek reconciliation and, if we fail, I will
strive to make our dispute a dignified one.
To the courts, and other tribunals, and to those who assist
them, I offer respect, candor, and courtesy. I will strive to do honor
to the search for justice.
To my colleagues in the practice of law, I offer concern for your
welfare. I will strive to make our association a professional
friendship.
To the profession, I offer assistance. I will strive to keep our
business a profession and our profession a calling in the spirit of
public service.
To the public and our systems of justice, I offer service. I will
strive to improve the law and our legal system, to make the law and
our legal system available to all, and to seek the common good
through the representation of my clients.
The Aspirational Statement is too lengthy to be replicated here. It is
divided into three parts: an introductory statement describing the problems
to which the aspirational ideals are addressed, general aspirational ideals, and
specific aspirational ideals. Here are a few examples to give you the flavor of
the ideals: "General Aspirational Ideals - As a lawyer, I will aspire:
(b) To model for others, and particularly for my clients, the
respect due to those we call upon to resolve our disputes and the
regard due to all participants in our dispute resolutions
processes.... (h) To achieve the excellences of our craft, especially
those that permit me to be the moral voice of clients to the public in
advocacy while being the moral voice of the public to client in coun-
seling. Good lawyering should be a moral achievement for both the
lawyer and the client .... Specific Aspirational Ideals - As to cli-
ents, I will aspire: . . . (b) To fully informed client decision-making.
As a professional, I should: (1) Counsel clients about all forms of
dispute resolutions; (2) Counsel clients about the value of coopera-
tion as a means towards the productive resolution of disputes....
(d) To comply with the obligations of confidentiality and the avoid-
ance of conflicting loyalties in a manner designed to achieve the
fidelity to clients that is the purpose of these obligations."
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA, CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM,
A LAWYER'S CREED AND ASPIRATIONAL STATEMENT ON PROFESSIONALISM
(1992) (amendments to Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Gov-
ernment of the State Bar of Georgia - Part IX) (reprinted in 422 S.E.2d LXVI
(1992)).
6. See, e.g., TORT AND INS. PRACTICE SEC., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, ABA
CREED AND PLEDGE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1988); YOUNG LAWYERS SEC.,
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, LAWYERS' PLEDGE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1989).
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legal education professionalism requirements; 9 annual profes-
sionalism convocations;' 0 mentoring programs; the revived
vitality of the American Inns of Court movement; state bar
journal regular columns on professionalism," and more. 12
There are good reasons to doubt that this is an altogether accu-
rate history of the Professionalism Movement, but I will have to
leave it to others to tell this story more truthfully.
Richard Abel, an ardent critic of all who claim the mantle
of a profession,"3 tells us that:
Professionalism is a much abused word. Occupa-
tions invoke it for self-serving purposes: to enhance their
social status, oppose government regulation, resist client
pressure, deny moral accountability, or justify restrictive
practices. Many social scientists uncritically adopted the
profession's own heavily retouched self-portrait, endow-
ing the concept with the miscellany of traits that
upwardly mobile occupations attributed to themselves:
technical competence, effective self-governance and reg-
ulation, and altruism. Even those social scientists who
sought to construct a more theoretical notion, such as
Carr-Saunders and Wilson in England, and Parsons in
7. The Supreme Court of Georgia revised the oath of office for lawyers
to its original form that included an -oath of honesty and announced the
change at its first annual convocation on professionalism.
8. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON CIVILITY OF THE SEVENTH FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT, FINAL REPORT -OF THE COMMITFEE ON CIVILITY OF THE SEVENTH
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUIT (Cornelia H. Tuite reporter, 1992); Marvin E.
Aspen, From the Bench: Doing Something About Civility in Litigation, LITIG.,
Winter 1992, at 3.
9. See, e.g., GEORGIA ST. BAR ASS'N, STATE BAR OF GEORGIA HANDBOOK,
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE
STATE BAR OF GEORGIA 161 (1961).
10. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. IN GEORGIA,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST. ANNUAL GEORGIA CONVOCATION ON
PROFESSIONALISM, THE PRACTICE OF LAW - Is THERE ANYTHING MORE To IT
THAN MAKING MONEY? (Michael Goldberg ed., 1989). Georgia has held an
annual convocation on professionalism every year subsequent to this report.
11. See, for example, the Professionalism Page in the Georgia State Bar
Journal.
12. See, e.g., YOUNG LAWYERS DIV., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, LAW STUDENT
OUTREACH PROJECT ON PROFESSIONALISM (1991); SPECIAL COORDINATING
COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM, AMERICAN BAR AsS'N (1989); ETHICAL DILEMMAS
AND PROFESSIONALISM (video series). The Georgia Chief Justice's
Commission on Professionalism is currently in the process of producing a
video series on professionalism as has the Center for Professionalism of the
University of Pennsylvania.
13. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?,
59 TEX. L. REV. 639 (1981); RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989).
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the United States, remained trapped within the profes-
sional ideology. 4
The Movement carries a lot of baggage in its name, and,
unfortunately, examples to support Professor Abel's caustic
accusations abound. Perhaps those seeking to improve our
profession, especially if the improvement is to be tied somehow
to "the public interest," would be well advised to avoid the
term altogether and cast their lot with some other moniker.
But "professionalism," is the term that should be used for this
Movement, even if it carries the baggage Professor Abel
describes, for it best captures the central claim that unites the
wide variety of activities undertaken in its name (and the cen-
tral claim that Professor Abel would find objectionable). This
central claim is that we make a particular, non-generalizable,
moral appeal when we remind someone that he or she is an
attorney.
This moral appeal is an appeal to that which is required of
us as a matter of lawyerly virtue if we are to become good law-
yers. Moral appeals such as this are functional; they depend for
their coherency upon some reasonably clear understanding of
the function of the practice appealed to whether the practice is
a narrow one of craft or the broad one of a well-lived life. The
functional moral appeal of the Professionalism Movement sug-
gests that the answer - "because this is what good lawyers do"
- can be an acceptable answer to questions as diverse as why
should a lawyer perform pro bono services, or counsel clients
on the moral character of the actions they consider, or offer
clients an option to contingency fees, or serve the public inter-
est at all. This answer works if the process of becoming a good
lawyer includes personal accomplishments that the practitioner
desires and that can be achieved only through the practice of
law. It works, that is, in Aristotle's terms by way of Alasdair
MacIntyre, t5 if the practice provides internal goods that serve
as moral motivation for practitioners.
14. Richard L. Abel, Taking Professionalism Seriously, 1989 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 41, 41 (footnotes omitted). For other radical critiques of
professionalism, see BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF
PROFESSIONALISM (1976); MAGALI S. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM:
A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977).
15. Anyone familiar with their work will know how indebted I am to
Alasdair MacIntyre and to my friend Stanley Hauerwas for much of what
follows.
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By way of illustration, Maclntyre tells us' 6 that it is possi-
ble to think of chess players in a practice as we think of lawyers
as in a practice. When we think of chess as a practice we can
see that there are two types of goods produced by the practice
of chess: internal and external goods. The internal goods of
chess are those that can come only from the practice of chess.
These goods are something like the enjoyment one can get
from an extremely clever opening gambit, or an efficient devel-
opment of pieces, or a new variation on a traditional defense,
and the development of the intellectual cleverness that pro-
duces such moves. These internal goods are understood with
reference to the traditions of chess. Chess players know how
well they are doing by comparing their own performances with
the best of those who have preceded them in the practice.
They learn from the masters in other words. Winning is impor-
tant to the internal goods, because it helps define them, but
winning is not an internal good itself. These internal goods are
not something chess players compete for. The fact that one
person achieves an internal good does not necessarily deny
that good to anyone else within the practice. What it means to
be a good chess player is defined, almost exclusively, by these
internal goods of chess.
The second type of goods of chess does not come from the
practice of chess, but are external to it. For chess, these exter-
nal goods are the goods of fame and fortune - for a very few.
Here winning takes on a different import and here the goods
are something that chess players compete for. These two kinds
of goods produce very different ethics for chess players. Take
cheating as an example. A player who cheats at chess cannot
enjoy the internal goods of chess. It makes no sense to cheat if
you are seeking the internal goods of the craft; in fact, cheating
denies those goods to the player. Notice also that there are
good reasons to be civil to the player on the other side if you
seek the internal goods of chess. You cannot have them with-
out the player on the other side. You are in a practice together
16. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 188-89 (2d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter AFtER VIRTUE]. A practice is defined as:
[Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity
are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that
form of activity, with the results that human powers to achieve
excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved,
are systematically extended.
Id. at 187.
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and are dependent on each other for the internal goods of that
practice. None of this, however, is true for the external goods
of fame and fortune. There is no reason, unique to chess, for
not cheating or for being civil if you seek only the external
goods of chess.
When a chess player fails to live up to the ethical standards
of chess, by coming too close to the line defining cheating for
example, those within the practice could call this player to
moral order by reminding her what it means to be a good chess
player and, in doing so, provide both the content and the moti-
vation for the player's reform. Such a reminder would be a
functional moral appeal, and it would work if the practice of
chess provided internal goods sufficient to motivate the chal-
lenged player to become a good chess player.
The particular, non-generalizable, moral appeal we make
when we remind someone that he or she is an attorney is a sim-
ilar functional moral appeal. It is not an appeal to special social
obligations imposed upon lawyers, nor an appeal to a sense of
fairness (in that lawyers are given much by society and, there-
fore, should give much in return). These are generalizable
moral appeals not unique to lawyering. Such appeals ask,
rather straight forwardly, that the one to whom the appeal is
directed either comply with duty or act fairly. It is only the con-
tent of appeals such as these, and not the necessary moral moti-
vation, that is provided by the appeal's reference to a particular
practice. An appeal to a morality internal to a practice, how-
ever, provides both content and moral motivation within the
context of the practice in which the appeal is made.
Functional moral appeals, such as this one, are a notably
ancient form of morality. Homeric poems, for example, reflect
a society "in which the most important judgments that can be
passed upon a man concern the way in which he discharges his
allotted social function," 7 and are appeals to the reader to rec-
ognize and to imitate the virtues of those who discharge them
well. We would not be too far from the true story, I bet, if we
said that functional moral appeals formed the basis, in action or
reaction, for almost all subsequent Western moralities.
Because we are so very familiar with these appeals, we know
well how to make them.i" What we do not know well, or no
longer know well, however, is what to do when a functional
17. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS 5 (1966).
18. For example, "good baseball players don't show up another
player," or "gentleman don't take advantage of the misfortunes of others," or
"be a mensch!"
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moral appeal has stopped working or has started working in
ways that seem to be corrupted according to the tradition of
the practice in which the appeal is made. To understand this
problem, recall the Biblical story of the woman taken in adul-
tery. A crowd of law professors (as Tom Shaffer likes to call
them) has gathered to stone her according to the law. Jesus
says to the crowd: "Let him who is without sin among you be
the first to throw a stone."' 9 Imagine how different the rest of
the story would have been if, instead of accepting this broad
functional moral appeal as binding on them, the crowd had
responded with either "We don't care about our sinfulness, we
are supposed to throw the stone," or "Let's all throw at the
same time so no one will be first!"
Initially, with speeches like Justice Burger's, the Profes-
sionalism Movement made simple functional moral appeals to
lawyers and did so in the manner the legal profession in this
country has always called its members to moral order, by rhe-
torical exhortation.2 ° But these initial appeals were obviously
inadequate to the task at hand, as all involved soon recognized,
save a few.
Because we, as a people, do not know well, or no longer
know well, what to do when functional moral appeals start fail-
ing, we should not be surprised to learn that the Professional-
ism Movement has struggled since its initial "callings" to the
profession. It has lurched from task to task; it has often pur-
sued seemingly irrelevant and ineffectual tasks; and it has failed
to pursue seriously some of the tasks it has begun. Addition-
ally, it has suffered from many of the diseases that seem regu-
larly to afflict bar activities: "itching ears," for example, as St.
Paul called it, 2 ' by which he meant listening only to those who
tell you what you want to hear and gathering teachers to suit
your own liking; a frequent obsession with who is to get how
much credit and for what; and even occasional Panglossian
views of the work that has been done. (This last disease would
be the most pernicious of all for the Movement.) Nevertheless,
as I will argue below, I believe that the Professionalism Move-
ment is doing what should be done as best as we now know
how to do it even with all its lurching and stumbling.
But why are the functional moral appeals of our craft fail-
ing? I believe their failure relates to a common theme of the
19. John 8:7.
20. See Jack L. Sammons, Voices From Our Collective Past: An Introduction,
41 MERCER L. REV. 479 (1990).
21. 2 Timothy 4:3.
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few academicians 2  who have bothered to pay attention to the
22. The reader will have noticed that the footnotes I used to chronicle
the Professionalism Movement's activities refer primarily to what has
happened in Georgia. (Your author was a founding member of the Georgia
Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism.) Georgia's activities,
however, while they do represent an advanced stage of the Movement, are
certainly not atypical. Much of what has happened and is happening in
Georgia has also happened in other states, and the Movement is now
extremely widespread. Because it is, and because the Movement raises
serious moral questions about our practice, one would think that this
Movement would have drawn its share of academic attention. But this has
not been the case. (I do not wish to separate myself from my colleagues by
using the term "academics". What I want to do is to distinguish the academic
writing that I am familiar with from the voluminous non-academic writing
that I am much less familiar with. It seems to me, from what I have read of
non-academic writing on the subject, that there is a significant difference in
the approaches of the two groups.) Most of those who have reacted have
done so with sadly predictable criticism. It is, with the exception of the work
of Tom Shaffer, whose work I describe in the text below, rather easy to
summarize most of the arguments the academic critics of the Professionalism
Movement make.
The most frequent arguments, true to our great tradition of anti-
traditionalism, are that there was no Golden Age for our profession, that our
past is not one we should be especially proud of, and that there are good
reasons for not turning to it for solutions to current problems as the
Movement often appears to do. Some of the academic critics who make this
argument believe the whole tradition should be rejected because of the evils
of some of its past and present conventions. Some believe that the idea of
profession is nothing more than a deception of the laity for the financial
benefit of the professional and the Movement is more of the same. Other
academic critics argue that nothing has changed in our profession, that the
complaints made now about the profession are the same ones lawyers and
others have always made. According to these critics, the decline in
professionalism is imaginary or is a conversation about changes within the
profession that have little to do with professionalism. Some academic critics
fear that the Movement will lead to a loss of service to individual interests
(from a loss of zeal or a decline in confidentiality as we try too hard to serve
the "public") while others critics respond that it will cause further failure in
our service to the "public." Rule-minded academic critics argue that the
ethical creeds, aspirational statements, oaths, and courtesy codes of the
Movement will lead us to a loss of what they believe is an emerging logic,
consistency and efficiency in the self regulation of the profession. Many
academic critics fear that by emphasizing the morality of a socially defined
role, the Movement risks our self-deception and furthers role corruption of
our personal moralities. Typically, many academic critics also note that the
term "professionalism" remains undefined. These critics attack much of
what the Movement does as simply platitudinous.
The above summary has based primarily on the following articles. I have
not attributed particular arguments to particular articles because I could not
do so in fairness to the authors without significant elaborations that would be
an unnecessary diversion from my purpose. See, e.g., THOMAS L. SHAFFER,
AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1991) [hereinafter SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS]; Jennifer G.
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Professionalism Movement: Whatever is happening in our pro-
Brown, Rethinking "The Practice of Law, " 41 EMORY L.J. 451 (1992); Michael
Davis, Professionalism Means Putting Your Profession First, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
341 (1988); Michael Distelhorst, Living in the Faith of Our Special Myths, 19 CAP.
U. L. REV. 1135 (1990); Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American
Adversary System, 41 EMORY L.J. 467 (1992); Nancy J. Moore, Professionalism
Reconsidered, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 773 (1987) [hereinafter Moore,
Professionalism Reconsidered]; Nancy J. Moore, Professionalism: Rekindled,
Reconsidered, or Reformulated, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 1121 (1990); Thomas D.
Morgan, The Fall and Rise of Professionalism, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 451 (1985)
(Professor Morgan believes: "[I]t is because of lawyers' preoccupation with
the desires of the client, to the exclusion of all else, that lawyers have been
experiencing a period of decline in professionalism .. " Id. at 452. He sees
this decline, caused in part by increasing numbers, reflected in changes in the
codes by which we are governed. These changes developed as lawyers
discovered that they "basically had a right to be in business" and as the
practice became more profitable than before. Id. at 457-60.); Kenneth L.
Penegar, The Professional Project: A Response to Terrell & Wildman, 41 EMORY L.J.
473 (1992); Robert E. Rodes Jr., Professionalism and Community: A Response to
Terrell and Wildman, 41 EMORY L.J. 485 (1992); Rotunda, supra note 2; Jack L.
Sammons & Linda H. Edwards, Honoring the Law in Communities of Force: Terrell
and Wildman's Teleology of Practice, 41 EMORY L.J. 489 (1992); Ted Schneyer,
Professionalism and Public Policy: The Case of House Counsel, 2 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 449, 450-51 (1988) (Professor Schneyer is concerned with placing
professionalism in context, that is, recognizing that the balancing of the
different principles governing lawyer conduct requires consideration of
particular contexts and an elaboration of policies for particular contexts. I
have no quarrel with Professor Schneyer's project at all and think that it is
extremely valuable, but my concern here, as I believe it is for most in the
Professionalism Movement, is not on issues of which principles are to govern
which situations, but on the character of the lawyers who are called upon to
exercise the practical wisdom Professor Schneyer demands of us and to act in
conformity with it.); Thomas L. Shaffer, Inaugural Howard Lichtenstein Lecture in
Legal Ethics: Lawyer Professionalism as a Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 393
(1990/1991); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Being a Professional Elder, 62 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 624 (1987); Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking
"Professionalism, "41 EMORY L.J. 403 (1992). In addition, Professors Geoffrey
Hazard, Monroe Freedman, and Ronald Rotunda have addressed the
movement in short newspaper or magazine articles that are probably more
widely read than any of the articles listed above. These include: Monroe
Freedman, Cases and Controversies: In the Matter of Manners, LEGAL TIMES, Mar.
11, 1991, at 23, 25; Monroe Freedman, Cases and Controversies: A Brief
"Professional" History, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 17, 1990 [hereinafter Freedman,
Cases and Controversies]; Geoffrey Hazard, Ethics: Civility Code May Lead to Less
Civility, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 26, 1990, at 13-14; and Ronald Rotunda, Challenging
the Ethics Myth: "Good Old Days" Were Not So Great, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 21,
1988, at 6.
I believe most of these arguments are off the mark for a variety of
reasons. Some represent misunderstandings of the way we do ethics; some
confuse an attempt to locate a practice historically within a tradition with an
acceptance of all of the tradition's past conventions; some confuse the
prescriptions of the past with its descriptions: some misunderstand the way in
which traditions, especially those intent on understanding themselves,
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fession is a reflection of changes in the larger society.2" To
understand what these changes are and how they affect us we
need to return again to an analysis of external and internal
goods.
The term the Professionalism Movement used most often
to explain what it means by a "Loss of Professionalism" is
"commercialization" of the practice. In the terminology of
Aristotle and MacIntyre, commercialization is the domination
of our practice by the external goods it can provide - fortune,
fame, power, prestige, and so forth - and by the accompany-
ing decrease in the ability of the profession to provide internal
goods that are valued by its practitioners. 24 Functional moral
appeals cannot work if a practice becomes too corrupted in this
way. This moral change in our practice could be coming from
within, as corruption often does, or it could be that commer-
cialization is being caused by either significant increases or sig-
nificant decreases in the external goods of our practice as
either would increase the value of external goods to the practi-
change and progress; some fail to recognize that the arguments used to attack
the tradition of our profession may be products of it; some falsely equate past
criticism of the profession with current ones (for example, the criticism that
the profession is becoming too commercial has been made for as long as
there has been a profession. But when it was made before the profession had
some clear idea of what it meant not to be commercial. This, as I argue in the
text, is something we are losing now and the criticism that we are becoming
commercial is quite different in this new context); some mischaracterize the
Professionalism Movement; some misunderstand the idea of a practice that is
foundational to it, and so forth. Rather than responding directly to these
arguments, or even responding directly to particular academic critics of the
Movement, I have in the text responded generally - and positively - with a
description of what I think is happening to our profession and, by so doing,
offer a definition of the problems the Professionalism Movement is trying to
solve. This way of proceeding will be maddening to some, I am sure, but
there are so many unshared assumptions and characterizations behind what
the academic critics assert that I think it will be more helpful to the
conversation in the long run if I try to present one reasonably clear
understanding of what the Movement is responding to rather responding
directly to the current academic critics of it.
23. See, e.g., Moore, Professionalism Reconsidered, supra note 22.
Unfortunately, these academic critics usually then go on, as Professor Moore
does, as if these changes in the larger society had no implication for the way
we are to think and act. Professor Moore has to do this because she relies
upon this larger community as her source for a moral authority - "ordinary
morality" in current parlance - that stands in judgment of the profession
and is there as an alternative to whatever morality the profession might
provide. If she took her description of moral changes in the larger society
too seriously, she would have no place to go for the morality she thinks
replaces that which can be offered by the profession.
24. See AfrER VIRTUE, supra note 16, at 181-203.
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tioner. Either we have been corrupted by a dramatic increase
in the economic value of our service, thereby increasing the
external goods of our practice, or our practice produces insuffi-
cient external goods, perhaps because of an increase in our
numbers, thereby increasing the value of those external goods
it does produce for practitioners. It could be, that is, that the
external goods of our practice have either increased so mark-
edly or decreased so markedly that the value of these external
goods for practitioners has increased to a point that upsets the
bal'ince of external and internal goods upon which any func-
tional morality depends. But these are very hard cases to make,
I think. Considered as a whole, it is very difficult to defend the
position that the external goods of our practice have either
increased or decreased so markedly.
A more profitable line of inquiry is to look for changes in
the larger society that account not for an increase or decrease
in external goods, but for a decrease in the ability of our prac-
tice to provide internal goods of value to its practitioners. If we
approach the "loss of professionalism" this way, we will see
that the problems our practice faces are caused by being
embedded in and dependent upon a culture that cannot sustain
our practice as one capable of providing internal goods.
One reason our culture is becoming increasingly incapable
of doing this is, as Plato first told us, that each true profession
depends upon a shared conception of the good - health, jus-
tice, salvation, etc. - towards which the profession aims. 5 For
25. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, bk. I, lines 331-36. Allan Bloom states:
Moreover, however much habit may play a role in the character we
call just, it is also clear that it is simply insufficient for a man to
follow rules without any knowledge of the reasons behind them.
Cephalus is proof enough of that. Our doctors are supposed to
obey the Hippocratic Oath and that obedience would, in a sense,
make them reliable. But ultimately, the most important thing is the
knowledge of the goodness of that oath, of the reasons why
following it is salutary. The worthwhileness of a doctor's activity
depends on this; and, no matter how technically proficient he may
be, his talents are useless or dangerous if there is no knowledge
about this first question. Justice necessarily and primarily demands
a knowledge of what is good for man and the community; otherwise
the knowledge and skills of the arts are in the service of authoritative
myths.
Allan Bloom, Interpretive Essay, in THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 321 (Allan Bloom
ed., 2d ed. 1991). Allan Bloom says that the questioning of the artisans in the
APOLOGY leads to the same results. "The doctor can produce health, but that
health is good he does not learn from medicine, and similarly with all the arts.
They deal with partial goods which presuppose a knowledge of the whole
good to which they minister." Id. at 322.
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such goods to sustain the professions, however, they also must
be related to some adequately shared conception of the good
of a life well-lived within a particular community.26 No agree-
ment in detail is required, of course, for with such agreement
there would be little need for the judgment of the professional;
but there must be agreement in general, an agreement ade-
quate to support the claim of moral authority the profession
makes.27 We simply cannot make sense of the teleologies of
the professions absent some sufficiently shared conception of
the good of a life well-lived within a particular community. The
problem for our profession is that the culture in which we live,
26. By the good of a well-lived life, I do not mean to adopt the
Aristotelian idea of the true end for man as a state of affairs. I mean instead
that we know a life well-lived by the virtues of the quest or journey that we are
now on. See, Alasdair MacIntyre, Can Medicine Dispense with a Theological
Perspective on Human Nature, in THE ROOTS OF ETHICS: SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND
VALUES 119 (David Callahan ed., 1981).
Monroe Freedman, a prominent critic of the Professionalism Movement,
and legal ethicist who has done the most, I think, to make legal ethics a
serious subject by his challenges to conventional understandings, offers us an
unintended demonstration of our need for some shared conception of the
good of a life well-lived in the following:
Here's one illustration of true professionalism. About 25 years
ago, I started putting on weight, so I took my vests to a Georgetown
tailor to have them let out. The tailor's response was, "A young
man like you shouldn't be letting himself get fat. I wouldn't touch
your vests." And, literally, she threw them back at me and told me
to get out of her shop.
Freedman, Cases and Controversies, surpa note 22, at 22. Professor Freedman
goes on to say that this is an example of what professionalism should be:
putting clients first. Id.
Of course, the tailor only put the client first by holding the client to a
conception of the good that the client may or may not have chosen for him-
self. The tailor sees the connection between this good and the moment by
being in the craft. This is exactly what we find ourselves no longer capable of
doing as lawyers with clients, as I argue below. If this example was, in fact,
what Professor Freedman meant by professionalism, I would have little quar-
rel with him, but it is clear from the cited column that he is more concerned
with the "lawyer as tailor" making it possible for the young man to choose to
be fat.
27. "Moral" is used here the way this term would be understood within
the Aristotelian tradition, that is, the moral is that which moves us towards
flourishing (eudaimonia in the Greek). The moral authority the profession
could have is that it brings to those it serves an understanding of moral
progress in the prevention and resolution of dispute. This is an Aristotelian
notion to be sure, but I do not think non-Aristotelians should reject it out of
hand. See, for example, MacIntyre, supra note 26 for a description of a
Kantian conception of moral progress that has more in common with this
Aristotelian tradition than we have been led to believe by those philosophers
who ignore the role of the summum bonum in Kant's work.
19931 THE PROFESSIONALISM MOVEMENT THE PROBLEMS DEFINED 281
while it has goods held in common, does not provide an ade-
quate or adequately shared conception of the good of a life
well-lived to which these common goods relate. For a long
time now, the legal profession has been facing the exception-
ally difficult task of translating a tradition that is dependent
upon an adequate and adequately shared conception of the
good of a life well-lived, as ours is, into a culture that seeks to
avoid any such conception because all such conceptions must
be, and must remain, private.
Our culture continues almost unaware of its own inability
to provide an adequate conception of the good of a life well-
lived because it relies upon traditions other than the liberal one
that has formed it. But our culture cannot continue to rely on
traditions that do carry with them adequate conceptions of the
good of a life well-lived because our liberalism is not sustaining
them. I make this claim descriptively; I do not know if liber-
alism cannot sustain such traditions, nor have I resolved for
myself whether it is possible for liberalism as a tradition to pro-
vide adequate conceptions of the good of a well-lived life.2"
But I do believe our liberal culture is not providing or sus-
taining adequate conceptions of the good of a life well-lived.
My descriptive claim is that traditions dependent upon concep-
tions of this good, as the tradition of our profession is, are in
demise in our liberal culture. One cannot help but think that
this is because these traditions, which both create and rely
upon authority that is not of our own choosing, threaten a lib-
eral culture that has choice as its foundational principle. It is a
culture, as Stanley Hauerwas has described it, that believes
"you should have no story other than the story you chose when
you had no story."29
28. See, for example, MICHAEL NOVAK, FREE PERSONS AND THE COMMON
GOOD (1989), for a Maritainian attempt to show that liberalism provides a
meaningful conception of the common good of its own. The common good
is not, of course, the same as an adequate conception of the good of a life
well-lived, but the projects are closely related in Maritain.
29. Stanley Hauerwas & Stanley Fish, Christian Practice and The Practice of
Law in a World Without Foundations, 1992 Vinson Lecture: The Character of Law, 43
MERCER L. REV. (forthcoming 1993). Hauerwas also tells us, in a much
earlier work, that there are historical reasons for this at least in so far as
American liberalism is concerned:
Liberalism is successful exactly because it supplies us with a myth
that seems to make sense of our social origins. For there is some
truth to the fact that we originally existed as a people without any
shared history, but came with many different kinds of histories. In
the absence of any shared history we seemed to lack anything in
common that could serve as a basis for societal cooperation.
Fortunately, liberalism provided a philosophical account of society
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There are, of course, common goods in our liberal culture.
There is, for example, a common good associated with the pro-
cess of private contracts licensing the pursuit of individual
goods. There is also an ethic for this process that we depend
upon in our pursuit of individual goods. The common goods
of a liberal society are, however, only instrumentally connected
with private, non-shared, conceptions of the good of a well-
lived life. Because these goods are only instrumental, they are
subject to the corruption that all instrumental goods are sub-
ject to, that is, that alternatives will appear, short-cuts really,
that permit us to achieve our private conceptions of the good
life without honoring the common goods. When this happens,
the common goods start becoming more honored in the
breach. For example, if a common good of a liberal society is
individual choice because choice is self-satisfying or self-fulfil-
ling in some way, some will seek to manipulate satisfaction
rather than providing true choices because this good of individ-
ual choice is only instrumental.3 0 Our liberal culture has pro-
vided only one sufficiently shared conception of a life well-lived
not purely instrumental in this way - the negative conception
of a life lived in the avoidance of harms.3 This limited concep-
tion of a well-lived life is inadequate, to support our profession,
designed to deal with exactly that problem: A people do not need a
shared history; all they need is a system of rules that will constitute
procedures for resolving disputes as they pursue their various
interests. Thus liberalism is a political philosophy committed to the
proposition that a social order and corresponding mode of
government can be formed on self-interest and consent.
STANLEY HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER: TOWARDS A CONSTRUC-
TIVE CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHIC 78 (1981).
30. This is the reason the survival of liberalism's primary contribution
to history, the dignity of the individual (a dignity it often fails to understand
as relational), remains a matter of great doubt as liberal societies adopt
economic utilitarianism's methods to accomplish their truer goals.
31. The avoidance of harms seems to be an outgrowth of the public/
private distinction that is foundational to liberalism. By placing matters of
meaning, religion for example, within the private to gain autonomy for them,
and by understanding the individual primarily as self-regarding, liberalism
not only reduced the public realm to formal institutions, but also made the
public realm a threat to the private world in which the individual defined his
or her own conception of the good and pursued it. Questions of interaction
in the public realm, the kinds of questions brought to lawyers for example,
are viewed then, understandably, primarily as matters of protection of purely
private pursuits. In addition, by placing so much value within the private,
liberalism promotes the maintenance of the life, health, and welfare of the
individual - so that private goods can continue to be pursued - as
paramount. This, then, leads to the kind of preoccupations with harms that
we see in our society, especially our obsession with death.
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however, because in only telling us what to avoid, it avoids
questions about the meaning of that which we do. Professions
turned to for good judgment, as ours is, and which depend
upon conceptions of a life well-lived, as ours does, simply can-
not avoid questions of meaning in this way although profes-
sionals may often try to do so. (It is, in fact, such a negative
conception of a good life that many lawyers now impose upon
their clients. Because this negative conception is so ingrained
in our liberal culture, these lawyers believe very warmly, how-
ever, that they are not only not imposing any good upon their
clients, but are somehow making them free.)
Alone, then, the common goods of our liberal culture are
an inadequate basis for the kind of community required to sus-
tain our profession. This analysis highlights.one root cause of
the problems that the Professionalism Movement seeks to
address. We need some adequate and adequately shared con-
ception of the good of a life well-lived in order for our profes-
sion to make sense; yet such a conception is disappearing from
our culture because our liberalism does not provide for or sus-
tain it. So now we muddle along as the tradition that formed us
slowly comes to an end.
We see the effect of this demise primarily in the loss of the
moral authority of our craft. The detachment we have from
our clients, a detachment we often mistakenly (and often pre-
sumptively) call objective, is one that assumes the moral
authority of our craft. It is a detachment from which we are to
provide the practical wisdom and good judgment that is essen-
tial to making our work a moral enterprise.3 2 But when the
moral authority of our craft is undermined - because we do
not know what practical wisdom or good judgment might be
without an adequate conception of the good of a life well-lived
towards which our wisdom and judgment might point - we
cannot understand our detachment from clients as anything
other than a different personal perspective; nor do we recog-
nize our authority as anything other than an assertion of per-
32. According to Stanley Hauerwas, Alasdair MacIntyre makes a similar
point about the practice of medicine. "For MacIntyre argues that the
authority of a doctor over a patient is not simply that deriving from the
technical skills of the physician or the surgeon, but rather derives from a
whole set of beliefs and practices deriving from a sense of the hierarchy of
human goods." Stanley Hauerwas, Communitarians and Medical Ethicists:
Or, "Why I Am None of the Above" (unpublished manuscript on file with
author). Professor Hauerwas cites Alasdair MacIntyre, Patients as Agents, in
PHILOSOPHICAL MEDICAL ETHICS: ITS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE (Stuart E.
Spicher & H. Tristram Engelhardt eds., 1977).
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sonal power over clients. Simply put, at the end of a culture
that does not provide or sustain adequate conceptions of the
good of a life well-lived, there would be no moral authority in
our craft and nothing left within it that could provide a basis for
judging both lawyer and client; that is, there would be nothing
separate from purely personal perspectives. At the end of such
a culture, we could no longer provide practical wisdom or good
judgment, nor would we be able to make sense of what these
might mean as the excellences of a craft. Additionally, because
our detachment would be purely personal, our representation
of clients with views we do not share would seem to us to be
pure hypocrisy, and we would rightly fear that the practice of
our craft, rather than being the school for virtue that a craft can
be, leads only to self-deception. To avoid this then, we would
limit ourselves to a narrow integrity defined only by a princi-
pled self-consistency strictly maintained to avoid self-deception
and the corruption of our personal moralities.33 But. self-
deception cannot be avoided by this principled consistency
because this consistency is bought at the price of self-deception
as we refuse to acknowledge morals that are not of our own
choosing or that create conflicts with those we do choose. And
so our moral efforts would fail.
I have described this as if it were a prediction, but many
will tell you that it is our present. For example, even now when
someone like Bill Kuntzler declares that he represents only
those he loves, we understand this to be a moral position
because unless we love those we represent we are reduced to
hypocrisy and, through hypocrisy, to self-deception, and
through self-deception to a corruption of our personal moral-
ity.34 We understand all this because we now no longer believe
we have a craft that can stand in judgment of both lawyer and
client. We now no longer believe in an integrity of craft - a
different kind of integrity from that proposed by Kuntzler -
understood within the tradition of the craft in a community of
craft that extends over time. In Kuntzler's stance, we are like
false priests who will only serve those we love because we must
33. See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND
ETHICS IN THE GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 25-88 (1986). For a
discussion of the difference between the principled consistency I refer to in
the text and the consistency required of the gentleman see Stanley Hauerwas,
Constancy and Forgiveness: The Novel as a School for Virtue, NOTRE DAME ENG. J.,
Summer 1983, at 24.
34. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Profession's Rule Against Vouching for
Clients: Advocacy and "The Manner That Is Man Himself," 7 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 145, 172-73 (1993).
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love them to know what salvation means for them - what, that
is, they have chosen salvation to mean.
The process of moving from the authority of a tradition of
craft to that of a purely personal perspective like Kuntzler's has
been a long one for the practice of law. Our tradition has con-
tinued as long as it has because we have been involved in a
persistent shift from a tradition with excellences of practical
wisdom and good judgment dependent upon a particular con-
ception of the good of a life well-lived to a practice that tries to
substitute for this traditional dependency conceptions of the
good life embodied in the law. At times, this slow and tedious
shift from the tradition of a craft to law has been almost unno-
ticed and almost unnoticeable. But the shift is obvious to us
now because the conceptions of the good life embodied in the
law are plainly inadequate substitutes - substitutes that
remain external to our practice; we depend upon them at the
price of the continuance of the tradition. For the conception of
a life well-lived embodied in the law only narrows the service
we can offer to our clients. We cowardly embrace this narrow-
ing to avoid the requirements of wisdom and judgment that are
the excellences of our tradition dependent craft because we
know the conceptions of the good of a life well-lived upon
which these excellences depend are not without challenge in
our liberal community - we can no longer rely upon them to
avoid conflict. This move is not only cowardly; it is deceptive.
The problems brought to the profession are not themselves
any narrower than before, nor could they be; so our service,
rather than being a true service, becomes a narrow technical
expertise that may or may not be of any real service to those to
whom it is offered.
Intriguingly, Tom Shaffer, who along with his daughter,
Mary Shaffer, has written about the ethics of our profession
better than anyone else, claims that the Professionalism Move-
ment does not respond to this problem of our excellences
becoming mere expertise. He warns, rather, that the Profes-
sionalism Movement takes us further in this direction. Accord-
ingly, we need to examine carefully Professor Shaffer's criticism
before going on.
Professor Shaffer tells us that the ethic of the practice of
law is that of the gentleman. He means this descriptively and
not necessarily prescriptively for our practice. No one, I think,
could be more ambivalent about this ethic of the gentleman
than Tom Shaffer has been. According to Professor Shaffer,
the best we can do as a profession is to be truthful to the gen-
tleman and truthful about him because he is the history of
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which we are a part. 5 He says that this gentleman is tarnished,
but perhaps not corrupt, and that he, the gentleman, may be
able to find ways of avoiding the temptations he brings with
him to the profession - especially the temptations of delusion
and self-deception - through tradition, craftsmanship, and lib-
eral learning." Professor Shaffer wants to make the gen-
tleman's persistence in the legal profession useful, he says, and
not merely inevitable. For Professor Shaffer, the Professional-
ism Movement is at odds with this ethic of the gentleman
because the Movement must rely upon a claim of an objective
technical expertise to disguise an inherent elitism it cannot now
acknowledge. 7 The Movement cannot acknowledge its inher-
ent elitism because:
[N]o one in the A.B.A. seems to know how to fit the gen-
tleman into our notions about equality .... If the A.B.A
were to admit that what it is appropriating is the gen-
tleman's ethic, it would find itself involved in a latter-day
defense of elitism - of a superiority the American law-
yer-gentleman has always taken for granted - and that
does not seem just now to be a promising posture for
maintaining or regaining the prominence of lawyers in
American society."
Not only is the Movement's alleged claim of an objective
technical expertise a disguise for an inherent elitism, according
to Professor Shaffer, but it is also inconsistent with the ethic of
the gentleman because the gentleman is truthful about who he
35. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 22, at 52. Occasionally,
one can get the impression from Shaffer's work that the gentleman was
forever locked in time in the early nineteenth century, and this would be
wrong. But the Southern Gentleman, at least, has been a remarkably stable
social type. Impressionistically, as a Southerner, I could argue that Robert E.
Lee may have been the last of what might be called the Anglican Gentleman
in the South and, after Lee, the Gentleman became Baptist - even though he
may have flourished more in Methodist and Presbyterian churches - and
somewhat less fussy than the Gentleman who proceeded him. I could also
argue that Martin Luther King's "Letter from A Birmingham Jail"
dramatically changed the Gentleman in the South forever. But, overall, the
ethic of the Southern Gentleman does not seem to have changed too
dramatically. For a conventional view of the Southern Gentleman in the
1860s, see DANIEL R. HUNDLEY, SOCIAL RELATIONS IN OUR SOUTHERN STATES
(La. St. U. Press ed. 1983) (1860). And for a brief and very entertaining
discussion of what has happened to the Southern Gentleman - and the
social types in the South - since then, see JOHN S. REED, SOUTHERN FOLK,
PLAIN AND FANCY (1986).
36. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 22, at 52-58.
37. Id. at 67.
38. Id.
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is. A claim of objective technical expertise, however, is not
truthful about who we are. He rightly fears, then, that a Move-
ment that must rely upon the ethic of the gentleman, but that
fails to acknowledge its reliance, will move us towards self-
deception, neglect of others, exclusivity, neglect of social con-
sequences, and so forth. In addition, a false claim of expertise
not only implies a general social hierarchy of expertise, but also
implies and creates a political hierarchy of professionals over
clients.39 In other words, the Movement explains the authority
of the lawyer, which traditionally has been an elitist authority,
by describing a social hierarchy of technical expertise and plac-
ing the lawyer at the top over her clients.
If Professor Shaffer's criticism of the Professionalism
Movement is true, it is so only because the term "professional-
ism," in Professor Shaffer's use of it, has been shaken loose
from the idea of a practice with moral authority. He should not
have shaken it loose so lightly, however. After telling us that
professionalism makes a false claim of an objective expertise,
Professor Shaffer then describes for us the virtues of a legal
craft with moral authority (such as the virtue of careful discrim-
ination) which, I suppose, someone else could describe as an
equally false claim of objective expertise and he could respond
that it is not; it is professionalism. The point is that any claim
of professional authority outside of the moral authority of a tra-
dition-dependent craft must appear as nothing other than an
unwarranted elitism.
What Professor Shaffer is seeing then may have far less to
do with the Professionalism Movement's unfaithfulness to the
truthfulness of the gentleman, or with false claims of an objec-
tive and technical expertise, and far more to do with an increas-
ing loss of the moral authority of our craft. Without this moral
authority, there are only two choices the professional can make:
Do what the client wants or do what I want. In this context, the
only serious question for professional ethics is who is to domi-
nate whom and how? And in this narrow context, the profes-
sional's claim of an objective technical expertise can be nothing
other than a poorly disguised attempt to deny that this domina-
tion is true. This claim, if believed by the professional, of
course forces the professional into the deception Shaffer
describes. When moral authority is lost then, we can quickly
see through any disguise and recognize the elitist assertion of
personal superiority that Professor Shaffer sees in the Profes-
39. Id. at 68-69.
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sionalism Movement. And this is the context in which his criti-
cism makes the most sense.
Stanley Hauerwas, relying on Alasdaire MacIntyre, pro-
vides a similar critique of the medical profession:
Accordingly physicians, who still must make decisions
about what is good for patients, are forced to derive their
authority from their technical expertise. Correlatively,
the patient is made even more powerless in order to
legitimate the illusory authority derived from technique.
Patient autonomy is therefore asserted [by medical
ethicists] as the only alternative to redress the unjust
power of the physician over the patient.4"
It is, however, far more difficult for the legal profession, as
opposed to the medical one, to maintain an "illusory authority
derived from technique." It is, ironically, far easier for the cli-
ents we serve to see our elitism because of the law's enormous
success in our culture. Within the liberal tradition, the law pro-
vides the primary basis for ordering all of our relationships.
This is true, in part, because the turning to the law becomes
habitual in cultures as diverse as ours because "the law .. .
becomes a principal carrier of those few values that our hetero-
geneous citizenry holds in common . . . . Law is one of the
chief means through which we order our lives together."'" As
this turning becomes habitual, we start failing to recognize ties
other than the civic ones that are defined by the law. It
becomes increasingly difficult, then, in such a culture to distin-
guish our legal relationships from who we are. Thus, the prac-
tical wisdom and good judgment our craft purports to offer to
clients as excellences acquired within a craft are increasingly
indistinguishable from what we think of as an ordinary ends/
means rationality required of all of us and not the excellences
of a craft at all. What little we can offer to clients as the excel-
lences of our craft now appears, as Shaffer describes it, as a
shallow technical expertise - one that does not require our
judgment or wisdom. As such, our claims of authority are
more easily revealed as unwarranted elitism supported by noth-
ing other than Shaffer's feared political hierarchy of profession-
als over clients.
But if Shaffer's discussion is, at rock bottom, concerned
with the loss of moral authority of our craft, then he and the
Movement are not at odds at all. He has just done a far better
40. Hauerwas, supra note 32.
41. Mary A. Glendon, Tradition and Creativity in Culture and Law, FIRST
THINGS, Nov., 1992, at 13.
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job of describing the excellences of our craft than the Move-
ment has, and, accordingly, comes closer to showing the way
towards an adequate understanding of our moral authority
than the Movement has.42
Nevertheless, there are problems with Professor Shaffer's
analysis: for Professor Shaffer's gentleman is the product of a
broader culture - a decidedly English one or, perhaps, Athe-
nian since the English gent was brought up in a nice version of
that culture - that has been adapted from that broader culture
to the American legal profession. His conception of the gen-
tleman rests upon a relationship between the gentleman and
the community in which he lives. The gentleman reminds the
community what its values are, he says.43 The gentleman as
lawyer must appeal to the moral commitments he finds in the
culture in which he practices. But the kind of moral commit-
ments he needs to sustain himself are the kind specifically
threatened by the culture in which he practices. What we need
to ask now about Professor Shaffer's gentleman is how he
should act when he is in a culture he must reject if he is to
continue to be a gentleman. (You can see a sad reflection of
this problem in the large number of older lawyers who now feel
they now longer "fit" in the profession. Their "fitting"
depended upon an identity-conferring decency that is now in
question.44 ) Professor Shaffer's truthful gentleman with clear
moral vision, I suppose, would not trust his own judgment in
these circumstances because he knows too well what happens
to good people in bad cultures.45 The true gentleman in a cor-
rupt society, in other words, knows he should not trust his own
instincts and, because he should not, he cannot continue being
a gentleman.
In addition to these problems, Shaffer's analysis creates
other tensions with the Professionalism Movement. As an ethic
borrowed by the craft, the ethic of the gentleman is different
from the ethic of craft the Movement seeks to return to. There
is a temptation in Shaffer's ethical scheme for American lawyers
to hold on to the gentleman of this broader culture as a substi-
tute for an ethic of craft - to be a true gentleman, that is, as
opposed to being a true gentleman-lawyer - and, thus, to
divide oneself in ways incompatible with being a gentleman at
all. This is one reason why Professor Shaffer's project as I have
42. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 22, at 70-7 1.
43. Id. at 56.
44. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
45. See JOHN KEKES, MORAL TRADITION AND INDIVIDUALITY 94-95 (1989).
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described it, while it is not like that of any other law professor,
ends, as they almost always do, by viewing our craft as a Faus-
tian temptation.4 6 His concern with our claims of a false objec-
tive and technical expertise is certainly justified, as I stated
before, if our craft has no moral authority. But this concern is
very hard to distinguish from the typical fear of "The Techni-
cian" (of whom Albert Speer is the best exemplar). Those who
write from this fear, and I would include most law professors in
this category, often neglect the possibility that "expertise" is
not objective or technical, but is instead the excellence of a
craft in good moral order. That is, such a craft may be a cor-
rection for self-deception (as Shaffer recognizes it could be).4 7
These professors depend upon Lutheran divisions of self from
work that are so ingrained in us that they have become com-
pletely invisible and, therefore, morally dangerous. Professor
Shaffer, to his credit, at least notes the possibility of craft in
good moral order as a way out and, when he does, his efforts
become indistinguishable from those of the Professionalism
Movement as I have described it.
But most legal ethicists do not proceed as Professor
Hauerwas suggests medical ethicists do in the face of
threatened elitism, nor do they understand the Professionalism
Movement's relationship to the ethics of our craft as Professor
Shaffer does. They do not assert greater client autonomy as
medical ethicists do as a necessary corrective for the unwar-
ranted elitism of professional domination. They cannot do this
because the primary ethical fear to which legal ethicists
respond is the fear of the unrestrained pursuit by clients of
individualistic and selfish interests. This pursuit, which dis-
serves the public interest and corrupts the lawyers who assist in
46. For example, Professor Shaffer apparently believes that there is a
sufficient content to an "ordinary morality" and that this content is so
inherently superior to that of the practice that we should use "ordinary
morality" as the criteria by which the practice is to be ultimately judged. I am
so suspicious of claims of "ordinary morality" that when Professor Shaffer
criticizes professionals for attempting to "operate outside the boundaries of
ordinary morality" I want to applaud them for doing just that.
Perhaps we are seeing the Greek origins of Professor Shaffer's gentleman
haunting him for most of the activities of today's lawyers would have been
banausic for the Greek gentleman and not capable of producing true virtue at
all.
47. For more on this fear of The Technician and on Albert Speer see
Jack L. Sammons, Rebellious Ethics and Albert Speer, 2 PROF. ETHICS
(forthcoming 1993), and the same article in AGAINST THE GRAIN: NEW
APPROACHES TO PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (Michael Goldberg ed., 1993) (revised
version emphasizing theological implications.).
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it, would only increase with greater client autonomy, or so
these legal ethicists assume. Nor do they return to the ethic of
the gentleman for honesty about who we are because doing so
only evokes for them the false claims of elitism Shaffer fears.
For these legal ethicists, then, the ethical question of who is to
dominate whom becomes: How are we to restrain our clients
morally without becoming moral elitists? How are we to domi-
nate without it being "we" who dominate? From this perspec-
tive, there are two possible answers, and almost all legal
ethicists respond to these ethical questions with some version
of one of these two answers.4" The first answer is a resort to
some conception of an "ordinary morality" that is located
within the larger community and known to the lawyer because
the lawyer is a person within this larger community. The sec-
ond answer is a resort to the authority of the state. My pur-
poses in this article do not require me to discredit these
possibilities because I am only trying to describe my under-
standing of the problems the Professional Movement addresses
and how it is addressing them.4 9 All my present purposes
require, I believe, is to note that both answers are inherently
destructive of the practice and cannot, therefore, be offered as
substitutes for a professionalism that seeks to return efficacy to
our functional moral appeals. In fact, in its reduction of a
moral enterprise to a legal one, the second answer leaves us
with what is a purely technical expertise, of little use to anyone,
that deceives us into believing that the law, even in the law
office, does not involve wisdom or judgment. This turn to the
state is exactly what many lawyers have done to substitute for
the lost moral authority of our craft. Interestingly, when law-
yers do turn to the authority of the state often what is left of the
moral authority of our practice shows up in a corrupted fashion
as these lawyers dishonestly exaggerate the legal risks to clients
of a proposed course of conduct to restrain their clients from
immoral conduct. This is how many good lawyers do moral
counseling these days.5"
In this resort to the authority of the state, legal ethicists are
not as limited as Hauerwas' medical ethicists may be, for law-
48. A notable exception to my complaint is Professor Shaffer, if I
understand him correctly. See SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 22.
49. My criticism of the first approach, and my argument that it is
inherently destructive of craft, is in Sammons, supra note 47. I have also
tried, with Professor Linda Edwards, also of Mercer, to criticize one version
of the second approach in Sammons & Edwards, supra note 22.
50. See Jack L. Sammons, Bucky's Reminder, GA. ST. B. J., Feb. 1991, at
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yers always have available the option of tuming to the authority
of the state to replace the lost moral authority of their craft. By
turning to the authority of the state, lawyers can restrain the
autonomy of their clients by the limits of what the law permits
and, tangentially, can buttress their claim of a technical exper-
tise in our ability to predict what the law does and does not
permit. For the Professionalism Movement, however, this turn
to the state for moral authority simply returns us to the prob-
lem, by a circuitous route, because there is then no functional
moral appeal in being a lawyer other than the obligations to
follow the law - obligations we share with all others.
Notably absent in the questions legal ethicists address, and
in their answers to them, is any conception of the moral author-
ity of a craft in good order. But this is a moral authority that
could provide the answer to the tension they see between
morality and freedom in the lawyer-client relationship. And it
is such a conception that the Professionalism Movement seeks
for our practice.
I want to be careful here because what I have said about
the moral authority of our craft to this point can be easily mis-
understood. I certainly do not mean that the moral authority
of our craft should be imposed upon our clients. Perhaps, I can
give an example of what I do mean, and the kind of answer a
craft in good moral order could be, by using as an example a
familiar ancient play about practical wisdom, counseling, and
the law.
In Sophocles' Antigone, Creon, as the city's representative,
was charged with enforcing the law that prevented the burial of
Polynices, Creon's relative, within the city of Attica. The law
prevented Polynices' burial because Polynices was a Thebian
traitor to the city fighting against his own brother, Eteocles. 5'
Antigone, sister of both Eteocles and Polynices feels that she
must break the law for the sake of her brother Polynices and
out of duty to the family dead. In Martha Nussbaum's brilliant
analysis, both Creon and Antigone are examples of "simplify-
ing the structure of one's value-commitments, refusing to
attach oneself to concerns that frequently, or even infre-
quently, generate conflicting demands." 52 She goes on:
Each of the protagonists has a vision of the world of
choice that forestalls serious practical conflict; each has a
simple deliberative standard and a set of concerns neatly
51. Although it is not clear, it appears that Creon went beyond what the
custom required of him by denying to Polynices any burial at all.
52. NU$SBAUM, supra note 33, at 51.
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ordered in terms of this. Each, therefore, approaches
problems of choice with unusual confidence and stability;
each seems unusually safe from the damages of luck.
And yet each, we are made to see, is somehow defective
in vision. Each has omitted recognition, denied claims,
called situations by names that are not their most rele-
vant or truest names. One is far more correct in the
actual content of her decision; but both have narrowed
their sights.5 3
Creon recognizes only the single good of the well-being of the
city, and Antigone that of family. For him, "no claims are
allowed to count as claims of justice unless they are claims on
behalf of the city .... -51 Creon's "single-ended conception...
prevents him from having an adequate conception of the
city."" Antigone's simplification is of the same order. She
denies the relevance of any distinction other than that of fam-
ily.56 She seeks to be pious, but her "rigid adherence to a sin-
gle narrow set of duties has caused her to misinterpret the
nature of piety itself."' 57 The Chorus sees both Creon and
Antigone as makers of their own law and the value-commit-
ments they serve as matters of their own choosing. In their
choices both have corrupted their feelings for other humans
and they see only what they want to see and hear only what they
what to hear.
What Creon and Antigone both need is a good lawyer.
They need someone who will open up the possibilities of their
worlds by the simple trick of asking what it means to bury, what
we mean by city boundaries, what this nomos truly requires,
what it means to serve the city or the family, and by telling the
truth to the client (as Teiresias does to Creon near the end of
the play). They need the moral distance and moral vision that
one not committed to narrow views of the world could bring.
They need:
(what Aristotle [urged] on his Platonist opponents) a
practical wisdom that bends responsively to the shape of
the natural world, accommodating itself to, giving due
recognition to, its complexities .... This deliberative art
53. Id. at 52.
54. Id. at 56.
55. Id. at 61.
56. Id. at 63.
57. Id. at 65.
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appropriately combines activity with passivity, fidelity to
its own nature with responsiveness to the world.58
This is what the craft of lawyering can do. But we should
not mistake what it is doing; this practical wisdom is not an
objective or technical expertise, nor does its moral authority
rest upon a facile recognition of the tragedy and complexity of
our world. It rests, instead, upon an implicit conception of the
good of a life well-lived in tragedy and complexity, a life lived
in truthful vision of the world around us, and in a society that
not only makes such lives possible but shapes us into the kind
of people for whom such lives are good.59 Neither practicing
attorneys nor legal ethicists have ever articulated well this
moral authority of our craft; we have never done an adequate
job of telling those we serve how we serve them and what we
have come to understand of the world through our craft. This,
too, then is part of the project of professionalism.
We need to articulate this moral authority to understand
both the relationship between lawyer and client and the service
the lawyer provides; but we also need to articulate it for our-
selves, for the problems the lack of moral authority creates are
also internal to the profession. Without the moral authority of
craft, without the detachment it provides, without something to
hold out as in judgment of both lawyer and client, and with the
loss of the internal goods of the craft these other losses entail,
nothing can be accomplished by being a good lawyer that can-
not be accomplished just as well in other ways. There can be
no good conception of how the legal apprenticeship can trans-
form the apprentice to our craft and no good reason to give to
the apprentice for wanting to be transformed.6" Consequently,
as a profession we can do little other than take the character of
our apprentices as we find them and give to these apprentices
not the practical wisdom or good judgment of our craft, but
mere technique. When we do this, of course, they soon under-
stand that there is little to be accomplished by a life in the law
because there are no longer any good ways of distinguishing
58. Id. at 80.
59. Inherent in what I am saying is the idea that the law, while a
separate practice, is not an autonomous activity. The law as a practice is
political, but the politics it serves are far different from what we now think of
as politics. As Hauerwas says, "[the law] must acknowledge that [it] is always
in service to a politics - a politics, that to be sure involves power, but not as
an end in itself but rather in service to goods such as marriage or the peaceful
resolution of conflicts." Hauerwas & Fish, supra note 29.
60. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL
ENQUIRY 127-46 (1990).
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the masters from the apprentices. The very idea of making
oneself an apprentice to our craft becomes incoherent in this
context as we lose our understanding of what it might mean to
become someone who shares in the moral authority of our craft
and in its teleological progress and whose character is shaped
by both. With this loss of understanding, our professioi
becomes only career, as William May reminds us,6 and, when
it does, we suffer another loss of detachment because career is
always defined by the status quo and weds us to the world in
ways that are inconsistent with the moral authority of our craft.
The problem of a loss of professionalism, then, becomes a
vicious one for the apprentice in pursuit of career.62
Thus far, in my attempt to describe what I think is happen-
ing to our profession and how the Professionalism Movement
responds to it, I have joined with the critics who said that the
problems in the profession - the reasons why functional moral
appeals fail - are a reflection of problems in the larger society.
I have argued that an increasing loss of the moral authority of
our craft follows from the inability of a liberal community to
provide an adequate conception of the good of a life well-lived,
or to sustain conceptions provided by other traditions, and I
have accused legal ethicists of neglecting the possibilities of the
moral authority of craft. I have tried to describe the effects of
this loss on our craft, in part through an examination of the
work of Professor Shaffer who, I argue, shares more with the
Professionalism Movement than he professes. The effects of
this loss of moral authority, I believe, are the problems
addressed by the Professionalism Movement as it endeavors to
restore our functional morality and the efficacy of our func-
tional moral appeals.But these are not the only problems in the larger society
that are affecting us, nor the only problems that explain the
failure of functional moral appeals. When the critics of the
Professionalism Movement tell us that what is happening in our
profession is a reflection of problems in the larger society, usu-
ally they do not have in mind the kind of problems I have
described thus far. Instead, they are referring to the increasing
61. William F. May, The Beleaguered Rulers: The Public Obligation of the
Professional, KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J., Mar. 1992, at 25-4 1.
62. Interestingly, students and apprentices are complaining loudly
about this loss of the moral authority of craft although certainly not in these
terms. I think they understand that we are passing very little of a craft along
to them. They understand the loss of something that is in judgment of them
as lawyers even though this way of thinking about an authority that is not of
their choosing may contradict much of what they learn in law schools.
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corruption of the larger society as it becomes a community
without the civic friendship upon which the liberal tradition
depends and without the decency upon which civic friendship
depends.63
I mean three things by this claim that the liberal tradition
depends upon a civic friendship that, in turn, depends upon
decency. First, following Kekes, decency seems to be a sine
qua non of good lives, however conceived, and it is especially
important for a liberal community because it "protects a large
area in which people can seek what they regard as good
lives."'  Second, even in a community held together by those
rules necessary to preserve each person's or each group's pur-
suit of a self-defined good, there must be some group that
administers and interprets these rules without just serving its
own pursuits so that the rules holding the community together
do not themselves become a ruse for one conception of the
good to dominate the others. At least this group, then, must be
held together not by shared pursuit of a self-defined good, but
by civic friendship and decency. Third, practices cannot con-
tinue without decency and practices provide the means by
which members of a liberal community pursue internal goods
that are an essential part of what can make life in the liberal
community good.
If this is correct, then what we should fear is that this pro-
gressive corruption will lead to our becoming the kind of com-
munity described in the following passage from Thucydides as
he tells us of the civil conflict in Corcyra in 424 BC:
Many were the calamities that befell the Greek cities
through this civil strife .... The customary verbal evalu-
ations of deeds were exchanged for new ones when ethi-
cal assessments were made; an unreasoning daring was
called courage and loyalty to party, a prudent delay spe-
cious cowardice; moderation and self-control came to be
63. I am indebted to KEKES, supra note 45, for this way of describing
what I am calling the corruption of our larger society. Kekes description of
the good of decency invokes an interesting combination of Aristotle and
Hume.
By noting liberalism's dependence upon civic friendship and decency I
certainly do not mean to imply that other social ethics are not so dependent.
The Homeric societies from which we first learned functional moral appeals
were themselves dependent upon civic friendship and decency and, as
Nussbaum explains that "it is not an exaggeration to say that the plot of the
Iliad centers around the central ethical value of pistos betairos, 'trustworthy
friend .. .and even enemies receive oaths and offer of hospitality without
suspicious precautions .... .' " NUSSBAUM, supra note 33, at 507 n.21.
64. KEKES, supra note 45, at 62.
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reckoned but the cloak of timidity, to have an under-
standing of the whole to be everywhere unwilling to act
.... If a man plotted and succeeded, he was intelligent;
if he suspected a plot he was even cleverer; and one who
took care so that neither a plot nor suspicion be needed
was a subverter of party .... Good faith between the
members of a party was secured not by the sanction of
divine nomos so much as by the partnership in crime; and
as for fair offers from opponents, they were received only
with precautionary action by the stronger party, not with
noble candor. A man thought more of avenging an
injury than of having no injury to avenge.
Thus did every type of bad practice take root in
Greece, fed by these civil wars. Openness, which is the
largest part of noble character was laughed down; it van-
ished. Mistrustful opposition of spirit carried the day,
destroying all trust. To reconcile them no speech was
strong enough, no oath fearful enough. All of them alike,
when they got the upper hand, calculating that security
was not to be hoped for, became more intent on self-pro-
tection than they were capable of trust.65
John Kekes, borrowing from Boris Pasternak, labels what
happens in communities like the one described by Thucydides,
skloka, 66 and he goes on:
In a society where skloka prevails, life cannot be good
for an essential ingredient is lacking .... [This ingredi-
ent] is decency: a mixture of spontaneous goodwill, cas-
ual friendliness, a spirit of mutual helpfulness. It is an
attitude fellow participants have towards each other and
friendly visitors. It assumes no intimacy; in fact, it holds
65. Nussbaum, supra note 33, at 404 (quoting Thuc. III 82-83).
66. A good description of sklka appears in KEKES, supra note 45:
Wherever you looked, in all our institutions, in all our homes, skloka
was brewing. Skloka is a phenomenon born of our social order an
entirely new term and concept, not to be translated into any
language in the civilized world. It is hard to define. It stands for
base, trivial hostility, unconscionable spite breeding petty intrigues,
the vicious pitting of one clique against another. It thrives on
calumny, informing, spying, scheming, slander, the igniting of base
passions. Taut nerves and weakening morals allow one individual or
group rabidly to hate another individual or group. Skloka is natural
for people who have been incited to attack one another, who have
been made bestial by desperation, who have been driven to the wall.
Id. at 51 (quoting BORIS PASTERNAK, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF BORIS PASTER-
NAK AND OLGA FRIEDENBERG 1910-1954, at 303-04 (Elliot Mossman ed. &
Elliot Mossman & Margaret Wettlin trans., 1982)).
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between passing acquaintances and strangers who have
nothing more in common than the mutual recognition
that they share the same social morality. It does not
involve deep feelings; it is not personal, for anyone may
be its beneficiary;- it is spontaneous, but hostility, rude-
ness, or abuse may destroy it. And if it is systematically
destroyed, skloka will take its place.6 7
What we should fear then is that decency in our culture is
being systematically destroyed and that skloka will take its place.
If this is true, our practice cannot be sustained. For as the
internal goods of our practice decrease in the way I have
described, the pursuit of external goods becomes increasingly
unconstrained and functional moral appeals lose their content
and the motivation they provide. Soon, there is no reason the
pursuit of external goods by those within the practice should
be any different from the pursuit of the same goods by those
outside it. When this happens, those in the practice learn from
the general culture the ways that work best for the pursuit of
external goods. What our practice learns from a culture mov-
ing towards skloka infects our craft with skloka. This then is
another part of what I think is meant when we say that the
problems in our profession are reflections of what is happening
in the larger society.
Our culture, of course, can continue even when there is
skloka, as Pasternak's Russia continued, but crafts cannot con-
tinue in skloka. Crafts may be the last practices in a culture to
be infected by skloka, but when they are, their deterioration is
rapid.68 It is difficult to underestimate the effect a loss of
decency can have on our craft. The nature of our work as an
interpretative community dependent upon a fragile language
(it is fragile because it is reciprocally dependent upon the same
community) that progresses primarily by the presentation or
consideration of opposing views makes us dependent upon a
shared decency if our work is to be craft at all.
Some of our dependency upon decency is different from
that of the larger society only in degree. 69 For example, work
within a craft is often identity-conferring in ways that member-
ship in a larger society cannot be and, accordingly, relation-
67. Id.
68. This may be more difficult to see in our practice, but it is self-
evident in many others, the practice of science, for example.
69. For a discussion of our dependency on decency for living good lives
see KEKES, supra note 45, at 50-86. I follow Kekes' analysis and terminology
in much of what follows in this section, although Kekes did not apply either to
practices or to craft.
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ships within the craft are delicate ones - personal ones - that
are more dependent upon decency. Consider also that within a
craft there is an ease with which we can recognize others as
people to whom decency is owed that is missing in the larger
society. This ease of identification creates common expecta-
tions that the other is also governed by similar moral conven-
tions, and it makes the failure of the other to act in the
conventional way a much more serious matter.
In any healthy community, shared moral conventions
establish a common identity and the conventions and the iden-
tity are accepted, not because they are imposed, but because
those within the community find them pleasing.7" These
shared moral conventions and common identity form the eval-
uative dimension of a social morality. And as John Kekes says:
The evaluative dimension of social morality is deep. It
goes beyond knowing how to use such terms as good and
evil, right and wrong. The depth comes from familiarity
with the discriminations, nuances, judgments of impor-
tance and priority, and from an aliveness to sources of
conflict and tension, all of which form the texture of the
social life guided by social morality. What we, as partici-
pants, know is, not merely that this person is decent and
that not, but also what makes them so and why one is
better or worse, more or less culpable or admirable,
weaker or stronger, more capable of improvement or
hopelessly corrupt than other people in similar circum-
stances. It is to know what is outrageous, shocking,
offensive, rather than a sophomoric attempt to provoke,
an assertion of independence, or a cry for help.7 '
70. Id. at 65. Kekes, using Aristotle's three forms of friendship,
describes communities as dependent upon civic friendship as opposed to
character friendship (the highest sort for Aristotle) or pleasure (or advantage
as it is often translated) friendship. The important difference is that
impersonal civic friendship depends not on immediate reciprocity but on an
assumption of it within the community. (Kekes says that in civic friendships
justice is something we lend to each other. We do not expect to get it back
from this person at this time, but for it to be returned within a society with a
convention of decency.) This is also the form of friendship required of a
healthy legal community. Kekes says that when we start losing civic
friendship, as I argue we are, we fall back upon character and pleasure
friendships that do depend on direct and immediate reciprocity. These are,
therefore, not only less stable, and more exclusive - Kekes says we have
trouble with the outsider, the outcast, and so forth, when this happens - but
they are divisive within the legal community.
71. Id. at 66.
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These assessments are even more crucial in a functionally
defined practice with an ethic of character, such as ours is, for it
is by these assessments that we come to know what it means
both to advance within the craft and to advance the craft
itself.72 Also, with practical wisdom and good judgment as
excellences of our craft, we are, as craftspeople, tied to the
quality of the legal community and to its moral conventions
since we must be able to judge the situation of the other accu-
rately and to communicate accurately that of our own. To do
so requires moral idioms that can arise only when there is
decency in the community - when there is the kind of open-
ness that Thucydides described.7" This then ties our concern
with skloka to our previous concern with a loss of moral author-
ity. For the excellences of our craft by which we manifest our
moral authority are social excellences dependent upon decency
and openness. Quite clearly, the very language we use for our
work changes when decency and openness are lost and our
excellences, as we had come to understand them, are no longer
possible for us.
As I mentioned, and as Tom Shaffer has argued, the ethic
of our practice is chiefly an ethic of character. We are depen-
dent, that is, upon an ethic of character. This is as one would
expect because it is easier to understand ethics of character in
the functionally defined activities of a craft. It is, in other
words, easier to understand an ethic of character when one has
the ethical standard of the good lawyer, understood within the
tradition of the craft, by which to measure success.7 4 But ethics
of character are notoriously dependent upon social conven-
72. This is true, in part, because in crafts like ours the character of the
practitioner becomes an almost indistinguishable component of the craft
itself. I would argue, contra Aristotle in so far as the arts are concerned, that
this is true of most crafts in good order.
As I noted earlier the history of functional moral appeals also tells us that
the societies from which we first learned these appeals were societies
dependent upon civic friendship and decency. See supra note 62. To say that
our craft depends upon these is a reflection of the nature of the craft's
functional moral appeal.
73. See supra note 65. For more on the requirement of openness see
NUSSBAUM, supra note 33, at 397- 421.
74. Shaffer, as discussed previously, argues that this standard is the
gentleman-lawyer. Of course, there are ethics, and ethics of character, within
our practice other than the gentleman-lawyer. In a healthy community of
practice, ethics conflict and these conflicts are moments that test the settled
interpretation of the teleology of the practice and advance the practice.
These conflicts, however, become ubiquitous in a disintegrating community
and, rather than advancing the tradition, become destructive of it.
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tions, and ours is certainly no different. 75 Loss of decency,
then, threatens our ethic in a way that is muted somewhat in
the larger community. If we were infected by skloka, we would
no longer know what our ethic required of us. And, as we
noted previously in the context of a practice without moral
authority, the gentleman-lawyer in a community of skloka would
not be able to trust his own intuitions for he knows too well
what happens to decent people in a corrupt society.7 6 As
Martha Nussbaum tells us, "[good characters in a corrupt soci-
ety] lose from without, the ability to exercise inherently rela-
tional virtues."7 7
But these difference are, thus far, all differences of degree
from the effects a loss of decency has upon the larger society.
There may also be differences that are more than differences of
degree, differences that reflect the nature and the role of the
internal goods of the legal craft in defining and sustaining it.
Those within a healthy legal community of craft for example,
must expect that other practitioners share a motivation towards
the internal goods of the craft. A motivation towards the inter-
nal goods means, in part, that the conduct of the practitioner
towards other practitioners is not just a rule compliance that is
independent of motivation, but is instead, conduct designed, in
part, to achieve the internal goods of the craft. Such conduct,
going beyond that which is required, is understood as a
decency towards other practitioners of the craft. It manifests
itself in a reluctance to extract the full measure of our
"rights." 78 When this decency is wanting, the offended practi-
tioner comes to understand that the community of craft is in
disarray and, because membership in the craft and compliance
with its moral conventions are identity-conferring for the prac-
titioner, the personal identities of the offended practitioners
are threatened. The way they attempt to preserve their identi-
ties, a way reflected in the current teaching of legal ethics, 79 is
by disengaging themselves from the craft, either psychologi-
cally or physically.
75. Of course, all ethics are dependent upon social conventions in
some way. I am only arguing here that the effect is immediate, obvious, and
personally felt in an ethic of character.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
77. NUSSBAUM, supra note 33, at 405. "[The] situation of decent people
in a disintegrating society is tragic. For whatever they do, evil follows."
KEKES, supra note 45, at 85.
78. See Evanoff v. Evanoff, 418 S.E.2d. 62 (Ga. 1992) (Benham, J.,
concurring).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
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The effects of this loss of decency and openness, then, are
another set of problems addressed by the Professionalism
Movement as it attempts to restore a functional morality and to
renew the efficacy of functional moral appeals. I have, at this
point, done what I set out to do: define the problems the Pro-
fessionalism Movement is trying to solve. These problems are
a reflection of changes in the larger society as I have argued in
accord with many academic critics of the Movement. They are
the effect of a liberal culture's inability to provide or sustain
adequate conceptions of the good of a life well-lived, and the
product of the corruption of a larger society moving towards
skloka and away from decency and openness. But when aca-
demic critics tell us that our problems are a reflection of
changes in the larger society, they mean to imply, I think, that
the profession is foolish to think that it can correct them. If
these changes come from without, is it not futile to try to
address them from within? I fear that I may have left the
reader with the same impression. If liberalism fails to provide
or sustain the kinds of conception of the good of a well-lived
life needed to make sense of our profession and to give moral
authority to it, and if we are becoming a community of skloka,
and if skloka, when it infects our practice, leads quickly to its
demise and the accompanying demise of our functional moral-
ity, then the task of the Professionalism Movement certainly
appears futile. And it will be futile if we continue to assume
that the larger society must write the script.
But we do not need to assume this. The practitioner who
assumes that the larger society through the efficiencies of the
moment must write her script becomes The Technician legal
ethicists fear so. When the practitioner does this she bonds to
a success defined by those in power.8 0 I am arguing here that
the same happens on a larger scale for practices when we
assume that the larger society must write the script-that the
larger society must define success for us by telling us what it
means to be a good lawyer. Rather, the practice must define
success for itself. Instead of turning the script over to the
larger society, we need, instead, to recognize that as a profes-
sion we are "entrusted with the pursuit of a [particular] good
and with the cultivation of those virtues necessary to achieve
it,""81 and we need to act as if this entrustment mattered. For
the way in which we can best serve the larger society as a pro-
fession, as Stanley Hauerwas tells us of the Church, is by stand-
80. See Sammons, supra note 47.
81. Maclntyre, supra note 32, at 206.
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ing against it within the. threatened tradition of our craft.8 2
And we do this, as the Professionalism Movement is attempting
to do, by strengthening the best of those things that remain of
our craft. And we do this by reminding ourselves of our shared
moral conventions (with creeds, codes, oaths, aspirational
statements, and by telling our story), by relearning what it
means to be a good lawyer (with mentoring programs, alterna-
tive dispute resolution programs, pro bono programs, and by
telling our story), by probing deeply within what remains of the
ethic of our profession (with convocations, panel discussions,
continuing legal education, in-house professionalism discus-
sions, and by telling our story), by reminding ourselves, that
ours is a separate community (with convocations again, local
legal community meetings, social events, and by telling our
story) and more.
But it is wrong of me to try to end so rhetorically. There is
clearly a tension here. I have described the goods that we are
entrusted with, however one might describe them, as making
sense only as part of an adequate and adequately shared con-
ception of the good of a life well-lived and I have argued that
we are dependent (as any craft of service would be) on our cul-
ture to provide this conception. But I have also argued that
our liberal community is not doing this. I think this is right and
yet I also think that what we must do is to return to these goods
that are now becoming incoherent. Quite frankly, I -do not
know what else we could do. We must act in the hope that by
strengthening the best of what remains within our craft we can
somehow return to the larger society that which it cannot pro-
vide for itself. I am not suggesting that. this will improve the
image of our profession, prevent outside regulation of it,
increase our purses or our honor, or even salve our troubled
consciences. But I am suggesting it is what we should do.
One small way we can start doing this is by changing what
we now do within the field I am most familiar with. Many
teachers of legal ethics teach and write in ways that are, as I
mentioned before, destructive of the moral authority of our
craft and, therefore, eventually destructive of our craft. The
resort to practices I make here is simply not an option that is
available to these teachers since for them morality is something
that comes from within individuals and is a matter of "deep"
personal choice. They are so intent on a Lutheran inspired
separation of "role morality" from "personal morality" that
82. See generally STANLEY HAUERWAS, AGAINST THE NATION - WAR AND
SURVIVAL IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY (1985).
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they cannot see our practice as a source of morality at all.8 3 It
is, instead, only a source of potential corruption. In their
romantic reliance on a personal morality, most return us, ironi-
cally perhaps, to a moral dependency upon the larger society
and, eventually, on the state. For these teachers of legal ethics,
then, there is no such thing as legal ethics. They cannot under-
stand the moral motivations of one within a craft, and the idea
that one would do something moral because one wished to be a
good lawyer is sadly missing from their analyses; their perspec-
tive is almost always one from outside the craft.84 This needs
to change. As guides into our craft, our ethics teachers need to
be well versed in and respectful of the moral authority it can
offer.
On the day Red Barber died, Bob Edwards told the follow-
ing story on Morning Edition. One of the many things Red Bar-
ber brought with him to broadcasting was a strong, home-
grown, family-grown, racial prejudice. When Jackie Robinson
was brought into baseball, Red not only fought against it, but
threatened, and seriously considered, quitting his job in pro-
test. One night, according to Mr. Edwards, Red was struggling
with what he should do when one word came to him that made
his decision an easy one. The word was "report." Red knew
that he was a reporter then, and that what he must do is report.
When he died, one of only two mementos of his many years in
baseball still displayed in his home was a framed autographed
picture of Jackie Robinson. 5
There are words that work like this for lawyers.
83. This is the second time I have blamed Luther for our sins. See supra
text accompanying note 2. It is probably more accurate to blame those who
followed him, especially Carlstadt for whom the individual conscience
became the sole criterion of faith. See Walter Sundberg, A Primer on the Devil,
FIRsT THINGS, Jan., 1993, at 15, 16.
84. For example, Professor Nancy Moore tells us: "[I]t may no longer
be possible (if it ever was) to persuade lawyers to conform to professional
norms, that is, absent some genuine fear of formal sanctions." Moore,
Professionalism Reconsidered, supra note 22, at 785.
85. My thanks to my friend Michael Goldberg for retelling this story to
me.
